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ABSTRACT
Governance has been a prominent word in international sport circles 
since the beginning of the twenty-first century. However, better 
governance will not cure all the ills of this wide-ranging sector 
and its numerous governing bodies, many of which, including the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Fédération Internationale 
de Football Association (FIFA) and the International Association of 
Athletics Federations (IAAF), have been shaken by corruption. This 
paper discusses the need for a new approach to sports governance 
that combines aspects of both corporate and democratic governance. 
It also shows that combating problems such as doping, match-fixing, 
hooliganism and sport corruption requires a wider international legal 
framework, developed through cooperation between government 
authorities and the sports sector. Only international regulation will 
ensure sport gains the improved governance it needs in order to 
preserve its integrity and value in the eyes of the public.
Introduction
It is now almost two decades since people started talking about governance in the Olympic 
system. The word first caught on in the world of sport during the ‘Salt Lake City scandal’, 
which shook the International Olympic Committee (IOC) at the end of 1998 and through-
out 1999 (Wenn, Barney, and Martyn 2011). The outcry over inducements paid to several 
IOC members by Salt Lake City’s 2002 Winter Olympics bid committee led the IOC to 
profoundly reform its governance (Chappelet 2012). Since then, many of the international 
sport federations (IFs) within the Olympic system have been tarnished by corruption scan-
dals of varying degrees of seriousness. Most recently, in 2015 and 2016, it has been the turn 
of two of the world’s biggest IFs, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA) and the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) to be hit by scan-
dal. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, governmental and intergovernmental 
bodies, national and international sport governing bodies and academics have put forward 
numerous lists – more than 30 in total – of governance principles for sport organizations. 
However, scandals have continued to emerge. Nevertheless, the FIFA and IAAF scandals 
appear to have been a turning point.
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The present article shows that preoccupations referred to under the term governance 
need to be examined from a much wider perspective, that of the regulation of international 
sport. Although international sport has its critics, it is a vitally important area that has a 
unique ability to promote peaceful coexistence and cooperation between people and coun-
tries. I begin this paper by presenting the current situation in sports governance. I then 
outline four possible scenarios for monitoring this governance and discuss three important 
governance questions that are rarely addressed. Section three describes a theoretical model 
of governance in which state supervision is a key component in improving the regulation 
of international sport. The paper concludes with a proposal for a long-term solution for 
introducing the regulation international sport needs in order to preserve its integrity and 
socio-educational value in the eyes of the public.
The state of sports governance
Following the Salt Lake City scandal, which led to the expulsion or resignation of ten IOC 
members in 1999 (and warnings for another ten), several international sport federations 
have been shaken by revelations of corruption. For example, between 2004 and 2008, the 
presidents of the IFs for volleyball (FIVB), judo (IJF) and taekwondo (WTU) had to resign 
both their federation presidencies and their seats on the IOC. Since then, many other 
‘affairs’, some better known than others, have come to light in other IFs, including boxing 
(AIBA), cycling (UCI), handball (IHF) and weightlifting (IWF), to name just the Olympic 
federations. Most recently, it has been the turn of the football (FIFA), athletics (IAAF) and 
shooting (ISSF) federations to be racked by scandal (AFP 2015). These ‘affairs’ and ‘scandals’ 
often result in a change of president.
Although these issues receive little media attention unless they affect a ‘major’ sport such 
as football, athletics or cycling, they have resulted in experts and academics taking a close 
interest in the governance of sport organizations. Hence, the European Union included a 
list of principles of ‘good governance’ for the sports movement in its ‘Declaration of Nice’ 
in 2000, (EU 2000) and, in January 2001, at a conference on governance held in Brussels by 
the European Olympic Committees and the International Automobile Federation, Jacques 
Rogge launched his bid for the IOC presidency by highlighting his position on governance: 
‘Since Sport is based on ethics and competition on fair play, the governance of sport must 
comply with the highest standards in terms of transparency, democracy and accountability’ 
(EOC 2001). The research community also made a substantial contribution. For example, 
Henry and Lee (2004) suggested seven principles for sports governance: Transparency, 
Accountability, Democracy, Social Responsibility, Equity, Effectiveness and Efficiency. In 
fact, 35 lists of governance principles had been published by 2013 (Chappelet and Mrkonjic 
2013), not including the list published that year by the European Union (EU 2013).
There is now a general consensus that sports governance should combine elements of 
corporate governance, as applied in the business world (Mallin 2011), and democratic 
governance, as advocated for the public sector, most notably by the World Bank (Bevir 
2010). In fact, sport organizations blend certain characteristics of commercial organizations 
(especially when they sell broadcasting or marketing rights for their events) with those of 
public organizations (when they draw up rules for their sports and their events).
In addition to this consensus on the general outline of sport governance (Figure 1), it 
is now accepted that setting out principles or guidelines is insufficient without an effective 
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SPORT IN SOCIETY  3
method for evaluating the governance of individual sport organizations. The first true set 
of governance indicators was the Basic Indicators for Better Governance of International 
Sport (BIBGIS), published by Chappelet and Mrkonjic in 2013, although the IOC’s ‘Basic 
Universal Principles of good governance of the Olympic and sports movement’ (IOC 2008) 
could be considered a governance checklist. Known as the BUPs, this long catalogue of 
some 120 guidelines (mostly expressed as recommendations) was drawn up in 2008 and 
approved by the Olympic Congress in 2009. In contrast, the BIBGIS consists of 63 indicators 
covering seven areas of governance: Organisational transparency, Reporting transparency, 
Stakeholders’ representation, Democratic process, Control mechanisms, Sport integrity and 
Solidarity. In 2015, the Danish organization Play the Game published its Sports Governance 
Observer, which uses 36 indicators to assess four areas of governance (Geeraert 2015). 
Also in 2015, the Australian government introduced 20 mandatory principles for sports 
governance (AIS 2015) and Sport England began promoting its Governance Strategy (SE, 
n.d.). National governing bodies in both these countries have to implement these guidelines 
in order to continue receiving government subsidies. At the end of the same year, the UK 
government’s strategy for sport (HMG 2015) called for a new governance code in the UK 
(section 8.4, pages 64, 65). In May of the following year, Britain’s prime minister, David 
Cameron, hosted an anti-corruption summit in London. His wish that the summit also 
address sport resulted in the two government agencies responsible for elite and grassroots 
sport publishing a Charter for Sports Governance (UK Sport & Sport England 2016). In 
fact, this charter is merely a precursor to a new code of governance for sport organizations, 
which is due to come into effect in 2017 but which was not ready for publication at the 
time of the summit.
Finally, in 2016, the General Assembly of the Association of Summer Olympic 
International Federations (ASOIF) endorsed 50 governance indicators covering five key 
principles (ten indicators for each principle: Transparency, Integrity, Democracy, Sports 
development and solidarity, and Control mechanisms), drawn up by an ad hoc taskforce 
(ASOIF 2016). The IFs within the ASOIF must now assess whether these indicators are 
respected in their organization. These audits will be in addition to the financial audits 
required under Swiss law (article 69b of Switzerland’s Civil Code) for large IFs based in 
Switzerland. The IOC demanded the introduction of such a monitoring system as a way 
of ensuring the large sums it distributes to the IFs from Olympic Games revenues are used 
appropriately (IOC 2015). At the same time (IOC 2015), the IOC’s Executive Board asked 
Figure 1. Sport governance at the intersection of corporate and democratic governances (after Henry 
and Lee 2004).
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4   J.-L. CHAPPELET
the Institute of Management Development (IMD), a business school based in Lausanne, 
to audit the IOC’s governance.
Governance has to be monitored over time in order to determine whether it is improving. 
Rather than the ‘good governance’ so often alluded to since the World Bank first popularized 
the term, the objective should be to ensure ‘better governance’ within each organization. 
The focus should be on helping sport organizations improve, not on producing meaning-
less rankings based on comparisons between very different, and therefore fundamentally 
incomparable, sport organizations.
Monitoring of sports governance
Carrying out such regular monitoring, which focuses mainly on internal operations, is not 
always easy, as is shown by the difficulties encountered by FIFA’s Audit and Compliance 
Committee (ACC). In fact, concerns over his independence led the chair of the ACC to 
resign in May 2016 (Gibson 2016) as he could be removed by a simple vote of the FIFA 
Council.
Four scenarios can be envisaged for carrying out this monitoring. The first scenario is for 
each sport organization to set up an internal entity to monitor its entire range of activities 
(not just its finances, although this is central). This is what the World Bank did when it 
created the World Bank Inspection Panel (WBIP), which assesses all the projects the Bank 
finances, some of which have been accused of corruption and of not promoting sustainable 
development. Such auditing entities must be independent and linked to the host organiza-
tion’s governing body, which must appoint members either permanently or on long-term 
mandates. Recent reforms within FIFA included the creation of such an entity, named the 
Audit and Compliance Committee, a step the body responsible for overseeing FIFA’s reform 
process, the Independent Governance Committee, considered essential (See Scala’s chapter 
in Pieth 2014). In 2007, The IAAF, as part of its governance reforms, created the Athletics 
Integrity Board and Unit to support its work in the field of integrity, including doping but 
also corruption, match-fixing, etc. This 4-member Board is elected by the IAAF Congress 
(of national associations = IAAF members) and reporting to it on a regular basis
The second scenario is to entrust monitoring to outside specialists, for example, one 
of the ‘big four’ accounting firms. In Switzerland, appointing external auditors has been 
obligatory since 2005 for nonprofit associations (most international sport organizations 
are associations) that exceed two of three thresholds set by Swiss law (article 69b of the 
Civil Code): turnover of more than CHF20 million; assets of more than CHF10 million; 
more than 50 employees. Such an audit should go beyond financial aspects and be totally 
independent, which is difficult to achieve because the auditor receives its remuneration 
from the organization it is auditing. For example, questions are still being asked about the 
absence of warnings from FIFA’s external auditors prior to 2015 (KPMG) or, perhaps, the 
failure to act on these warnings. In fact, KPMG resigned as FIFA auditors in 2016 because 
of the potential systemic risk to its reputation.
The third scenario is to create a specialist body to monitor and help improve the gov-
ernance of all international sport organizations. The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), 
set up in 1999 to coordinate the global fight against doping, could provide a model for such 
a body. In fact, many people continue to call for the creation of a World Anti-Corruption 
Agency (WACA) or for a less constraining International Sport Integrity Partnership (ISIP). 
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SPORT IN SOCIETY  5
Because creating this type of monitoring or surveillance organization or scheme would 
undoubtedly generate resistance and apprehension, it would probably be necessary to con-
clude an international convention (as was done for WADA) to ensure public authorities 
across the globe cooperate in the fight to eliminate what can be termed ‘the dark side of 
sport’. Switzerland, as the main host of international sport organizations, could sponsor such 
a convention. Another long-standing example of cooperation in the world of international 
sport is provided by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), which was set up in 1983 
under Swiss law and whose authority is now accepted by all Olympic sport organizations, 
including FIFA (last IF to accept).
The fourth scenario is a sort of compromise between the second and third scenarios. It 
is inspired by the audits of intergovernmental organizations within the UN, which involve 
appointing auditors on the basis of regular calls for tenders from specialist national auditing 
bodies known for their independence and impartiality. For example, in recent years the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has been audited by Switzerland’s Federal 
Audit Office, which, in this case, reports to the member states that form WIPO’s governing 
body (and to the public via WIPO’s website). Hence, member states receive assessments and 
recommendations that do not originate from the organization’s management or a private 
service provider whose conclusions may not be entirely impartial.
All of these scenarios involve costs, but they could also generate savings and synergies 
for sport organizations if they could pool their efforts as they do in anti-doping with the 
Sport-Accord dedicated unit. They can be implemented in parallel and on a voluntary 
basis, which would facilitate their adoption. However, one thing is clear: the status quo has 
become untenable and, given the damage done to the reputation of international sport in 
2015 and 2016, a solution must be found very quickly.
In addition, there are three important questions relating to sports governance that have 
almost never been addressed. The first is the use of funds distributed to the members 
of IFs (national federations) or Olympic stakeholders (mostly IFs and National Olympic 
Committees – NOCs). Are these funds being used ‘correctly’ in order to develop sport? Is 
there not a risk they may end up in the pockets of local sports administrators? To mitigate 
this risk, the IOC’s NOCs Relations Department has developed a self-assessment tool called 
UMAP (Understanding, Managing, Auditing, Planning), which is available online to all 
NOCs around the world.
The second question concerns the fact that, in nearly all sport organizations, the pres-
ident is responsible for running both the organization’s regulation activities (under the 
board’s control) and its business activities. This trend was started by Samaranch, when 
he became president of the IOC in 1980 (Chappelet 2014), and by Blatter, when he was 
elected president of FIFA in 1998. In other words, in most sport organizations, the CEO is 
also the chairman of the board, a state of affairs that is frowned upon by many corporate 
governance guidelines (see, for example, The UK Corporate Governance Code, June 2010, 
section A.3.1), even though this issue remains open to debate in the literature (e.g. Tonello 
2011). A candidate to the FIFA presidency in 2016 proposed that the roles of regulation and 
commercialization be clearly separated by creating two different organisations in charge of 
each roles, but he was not elected.
The third question arises from the way host cities (or, in some cases, countries or national 
federations) for major sports events are chosen. The attribution of major events has gen-
erated numerous scandals that have led to governance reforms (selection of Salt Lake City 
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6   J.-L. CHAPPELET
to host the 2002 Winter Olympics, selection of Qatar for the 2022 Football World Cup, 
selection of host cities for the World Championships in Athletics, etc.). Depending on the 
statutes of the organizations in question, host cities tend to be chosen by a small number 
of electors (around 100 at the IOC, 200 at FIFA, 20 at the IAAF), which makes the system 
more susceptible to corruption. One solution would be to greatly increase the number 
of electors by expanding electorates to include, for example, former Olympians (athletes 
who have taken part in the Olympics), former players in the World Cup, athletes or fans, 
etc. Such a massive increase in the number of voters would substantially reduce the risk of 
corruption. No organization has, as yet, contemplated such a reform, as it would have to 
be approved by the very people who currently choose host cities/nations/federations and 
who would thereby lose some of their power. But such a reform could be adopted for future 
decisions, thereby delaying the loss of power and the resistance of current voters. FIFA’s 
response, as part of its 2015 governance reforms, was to transfer this electoral power from 
its executive committee (25 members) to the FIFA Congress (209 members in 2015), which, 
unsurprisingly, was happy to approve a reform that gave it more power.
A useful model of governance
Pérez’s (2003) model for corporate governance provides a useful template for analysing 
sports governance because it differentiates between five levels of governance, from day-
to-day management to the legal framework governing an organization’s operations. This 
model (Figure 2) was designed to address five fundamental questions concerning corporate 
governance. Although it was drawn up for the business sector, it can also be applied to sport 
organizations.
Applying this model to the IOC produces the following pyramid (see Figure 3), following 
the reforms introduced in 1999 in the wake of the Salt Lake City scandal (for more details, 
see Chappelet 2012).
The first three levels of Pérez’s model depend mostly on internal structures and statutes 
set up by the organization in question. In contrast, the top two levels (4 and 5) require 
government supervision via national or international law.
Figure 2. the five questions associated with pérez’s five levels of governance.
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SPORT IN SOCIETY  7
The IOC falls mostly under the jurisdiction of Swiss law because, like many other inter-
national sport organizations, it is based in Switzerland and subject to articles 60–79 of the 
Swiss civil code (for Swiss nonprofit associations). It is also subject to other Swiss laws 
and to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (set up under chapter 12 of the Swiss federal law 
on international private law), which is recognized by all the IFs of Olympic sports as the 
supreme body for settling sport related disputes. Olympic sports organizations accept the 
need to collaborate with national governments, as long as they retain their autonomy. The 
‘price’ they pay for this autonomy is an obligation to implement ‘good governance’ (see, for 
example, point 7 of the BUPs: ‘Harmonious relations with governments while preserving 
autonomy’, IOC 2008).
Currently, there is little international legislation that can be directly applied to sport. The 
exceptions to this rule fall into four areas and are covered by four international treaties/
conventions:
•  Sports events spectator violence (Council of Europe 1985), integrated safety (Council 
of Europe 2016).
•  Doping (UNESCO 2005).
•  Match-fixing (Council of Europe 2014).
•  (Public and private) corruption (United Nations 2003).
However, there is an increasing tendency for governments that have ratified these treaties 
to draw up or amend national laws in order to cover sport. For example, changes to Swiss 
law have led to a number of prosecutions in the country’s civil courts (FIFA, doping and 
other affairs, see Chappelet 2010). Investigations have also been carried out by prosecutors 
in countries hosting sports events and French prosecutors have looked into the affairs of 
the IAAF (the accused IAAF president was resident in France). In 2016, Brazil’s justice 
department brought charges in a case of ticket-touting involving an IOC member and a 
Brazilian court ordered the seizure of Olympic Broadcast Services’ assets after the company 
was accused of breaking labour laws at the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro.
Most significantly, US law is playing an ever more important role in international sport. 
For example, it was the US Department of Justice that ordered the arrest of a dozen FIFA 
Figure 3. pérez’s model applied to the ioc.
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8   J.-L. CHAPPELET
executives in Switzerland and, in 2016, the US attorney’s office for the Eastern District of 
New York started investigating allegations of doping at the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, 
Russia. American prosecutors are able to do this thanks to the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act, which extends their jurisdiction well beyond the United 
States under certain circumstances (Henning 2016).
Improving the regulation of international sport: a possible solution
The growth of sport during the twentieth century led to misconduct in areas other than 
spectator violence (hooliganism), doping and match-fixing, which, as noted in the previous 
section, are subject to international conventions and, once these conventions have been 
ratified, to provisions of national laws passed thereafter. Although many forms of financial 
corruption are covered by the anti-corruption conventions drawn up by organizations such 
as the United Nations, Council of Europe and Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, corruption in (private) sport organizations can take many non-finan-
cial forms, including using inducements to influence the attribution of sports events, the 
trafficking of children and the violation of workers’ rights, etc. All of these issues affect 
the integrity of sport and damage the credibility sport needs in order to generate revenues 
through ticket sales, sponsorship and broadcasting rights (Pound 2016).
Several authors have suggested ways of combating these problems and thereby improv-
ing the regulation of international sport. In 2014, the IOC created an internal Ethics and 
Compliance Office (in addition to its Ethics Commission, set up in 1999). Chappelet (2011) 
argued for the creation of an Olympic accountability watchdog, and the World Anti-Doping 
Agency used the 2011 European Union Sports Forum to call for the creation of a global 
anti-corruption agency (Harris 2011). Launched in April 2016 under the auspices of the 
International Centre for Sport Security (ICSS 2016), the Sport Integrity Global Alliance 
(SIGA) has published its Universal Standards of Sport Integrity (October 2016). Also in 
2016, the IOC set up a Joint Integrity Intelligence Unit in order to monitor and assess any 
potential unethical activities at the Rio Olympics, as was done with respect to match-fixing 
for London 2012 (Chappelet 2015). Three British and Irish boxers were reprimanded for 
betting on the Rio 2016 boxing competitions, even though they were not participating 
(Ingle 2016). Finally, in February 2016, the IOC launched its International Sports Integrity 
Partnership (ISIP) at a major conference in Lausanne.
Although these initiatives have their value, they have not managed to involve the world’s 
national governments, without which levels 4 and 5 of Pérez’s governance model cannot be 
implemented. A more effective solution than voluntary ‘alliances’ or ‘partnerships’ would 
be to adopt an international convention linking national governments and sports organi-
zations in the same way that the Geneva Conventions bring together signatory states and 
the governmental and non-governmental bodies that make up the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement (IRCRCM).
These Conventions were drafted in 1949 on the basis of the 1864 Geneva Convention, 
signed when the International Committee of the Red Cross was formed, have now been 
ratified by 188 countries (against 183 countries for the UNESCO anti-doping convention 
in 2016). They lay out the framework within which the IRCRCM operates and cover the 
humanitarian rights of soldiers wounded during wars, shipwreck victims, prisoners of war 
and civilians in enemy-controlled territory.
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SPORT IN SOCIETY  9
One or more conventions (which could be known as the ‘Lausanne Conventions’ in 
honour of the role this city has played in the development of international sport) could be 
drawn up to provide an international legal framework, in the sense of Pérez’s model (2003), 
for world sport that would combat the ‘dark side of sport’ and promote its ‘bright side’. Such 
a Lausanne convention could create a body to audit sports organizations, as discussed in 
the second part of this article.
Conclusion
Adequate sports governance cannot exist without greater government involvement in regu-
lating international sport and, consequently, national sport. Only governments can provide 
a national legal framework (fifth and final level of Pérez’s model of governance) and prepare 
the ground for drawing up a treaty or convention as the basis for international sports legis-
lation. Such a treaty is becoming increasingly indispensable for a global sector with many 
cases of misconduct in several areas, including doping, match-fixing, hooliganism, racism, 
human rights violations and corruption. This regulation must respect the autonomy of sport 
organizations, as recommended by the Council of Europe’s European Sports Charter. In 
terms of the integrity of sport, guaranteeing the ‘responsible autonomy’ of sport organiza-
tions, most of which are nonprofit organizations, in exchange for adequate governance is 
arguably the best compromise between state and private control.
The alternative of state control is not realistic in so far as national governments have other 
priorities than sporting activities and performance (which would, in that case, be managed 
by public bodies rather than nonprofit associations) and do not have the means to finance 
sports activities (which are currently self-financed by the revenues from major sporting 
events, most notably the Olympic Games). The privatization of activities linked to sporting 
performance could be envisaged, as is the case for several sports in North America, but this 
would quickly turn sport into a branch of the entertainment industry. In fact, the United 
States’ major professional leagues (MLB, NBA, MLS and, more recently, NFL) are for-profit 
corporations subject to taxation. Following a proposal put forward by an MP from Zurich 
named Cédric Wermuth (2016), Switzerland’s parliament could soon debate the issue of 
how major IFs are taxed and the possibility of changing their legal form.
Hence, sport organizations and their governance are destined to combine elements of 
corporate governance (from the private sector) with aspects of democratic governance 
(from the public sector), as shown in Figure 1. Only intergovernmental treaties can provide 
the international legal framework needed to oversee this new form of sport governance. 
Benefits and drawbacks of such a convention or conventions should be further studied.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
References
AFP. 2015. FIFA and IAAF Scandals Warning for Corrupt Sports Administrators, December 30. 
Accessed October 1, 2016. www.dawn.com/news/1229640
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
ire
 D
e L
au
sa
nn
e] 
at 
05
:16
 29
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
10   J.-L. CHAPPELET
AIS. 2015. Australian Mandatory Sports Governance Principles, June. Australian Government, 
Australian Sports Commission. Accessed October 1, 2016. www.ausport.gov.au/supporting/
governance/mandatory_sports_governance_principles
ASOIF. 2016. ASOIF Governance Task Force (GTF) – 1st Report to ASOIF Council. Lausanne: 
Association of Summer Olympic International Federations.
Bevir, M. 2010. Democratic Governance. Princeton, NJ: University Press.
Chappelet, J.-L. 2010. The Autonomy of Sport in Europe. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.
Chappelet, J.-L. 2011. “Towards Better Olympic Accountability.” Sport in Society 14 (3): 319–331. 
doi:10.1080/17430437.2011.557268
Chappelet, J.-L. 2012. “From Daily Management to High Politics: The Governance of the International 
Olympic Committee.” In The Handbook of International Sport Management, edited by L. Robinson, 
and R. Palmer, 7–25. London: Routledge.
Chappelet, J.-L. 2014. “Une vie consacrée au sport: Juan Antonio Samaranch [A Life Dedicated to 
Sport: Juan Antonio Samaranch].” In Les grands dirigeants du sport [The Leaders of Sport], edited 
by E. Bayle, 237–252. Bruxelles: De Boeck.
Chappelet, J.-L. 2015. “The Olympic Fight against Match-fixing.” Sport in Society 18 (10): 1260–1272. 
doi:10.1080/17430437.2015.1034519
Chappelet, J.-L., and M. Mrkonjic. 2013. Basic Indicators for Better Governance in International 
Sport (BIBGIS): An Assessment Tool for International Sport Governing Bodies. Lausanne: IDHEAP 
Working Paper, 1/2013.
Council of Europe. 1985. European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports 
Events and in Particular at Football Matches, August. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
Council of Europe. 2014. Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competition, September. Macolin: 
Council of Europe. This Convention was Totally Revised in 2016.
Council of Europe. 2016. Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football 
Matches and Other Sports Events, July. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
EOC. 2001. Statement of Good Governance Principles, “The Rules of the Game” First International 
Governance in Sport Conference, January. Brussels.
EU. 2000. Nice Declaration on the Specific Characteristics of Sport and Its Social Function in Europe, 
Adopted by the European Council in Nice.
EU. 2013. Principles of Good Governance in Sport, September. Deliverable 2, Brussels: Expert Group 
“Good Governance”.
Geeraert, A. 2015. Sports Governance Observer 2015: The Legitimacy Crisis in International Sports 
Governance. Copenhagen: Play The Game.
Gibson, O. 2016. “Fifa’s Independent Audit Committee Chairman Resigns in Protest at Reforms.” 
The Guardian, May 14.
Harris, N. 2011. “Head of WADA Calls for Global Anti-corruption Body.” Sporting Intelligence, 
February 23. www.sportingintelligence.com/2011/02/23/head-of-wada-calls-for-global-anti-
corruption-body-230201.
Henning, P. J. 2016. “Road Map for Pursuit of Soccer Charges.” International New York Times, June 
29, 14.
Henry, I., and P. C. Lee. 2004. “Governance and Ethics in Sport.” In The Business of Sport Management, 
edited by J. Beech and S. Chadwick, 25–42. Harlow: Prentice Hall.
HMG. 2015. Sporting Future: A New Strategy for an Active Nation, December. London: Her Majesty’s 
Government.
ICSS. 2016. New Sport Integrity Global Alliance (SIGA) Launched, April. Madrid. Accessed October 
1, 2016. www.theicss.org/en/news/read/new-sport-integrity-global-alliance-siga-launched
Ingle, S. 2016. “IOC Reprimands British and Irish Boxers for Betting on Rio Olympics Bouts.” The 
Guardian, September 28.
IOC. 2008. Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement. 
Lausanne: International Olympic Committee.
IOC. 2015. IOC Executive Board Adopts Declaration on Good Governance in Sport and the Protection 
of Clean Athletes, Press Release, 15 December. Accessed October 1, 2015. www.olympic.org/news/
ioc-executive-board-adopts-declaration-on-good-governance-in-sport-and-the-protection-of-
clean-athletes
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
ire
 D
e L
au
sa
nn
e] 
at 
05
:16
 29
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
SPORT IN SOCIETY  11
Mallin, C. A. 2011. Handbook on International Corporate Governance: Country Analyses. 2nd ed. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Pérez, R. 2003. La gouvernance de l’entreprise [Corporate Governance]. Paris: la découverte.
Pieth, M., ed. 2014. Reforming FIFA. Zurich: Dike Verlag.
Pound, R. 2016. “If Football Doesn’t Get a Grip, Fans Will Turn off the Money Tap.” The Telegraph, 
September 30.
SE. n.d. Sport England Sport Governance Strategy: On Board for Better Governance. London: Sport 
England.
Tonello, M. 2011. “Separation of Chair and CEO Roles.” Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate 
Governance and Financial Regulation, September 1, Accessed October 1, 2016. https://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2011/09/01/separation-of-chair-and-ceo-roles/#2b
UK Sport & Sport England. 2016. A Charter for Sports Governance in the United Kingdom. London: 
UK Sport & Sport England.
UNESCO. 2005. International Convention against Doping in Sport, October. Paris: United Nations 
Education, Science and Culture Organisation.
United Nations. 2003. Convention against Corruption, October. New York: United Nations.
Wenn, S., R. Barney, and S. Martyn. 2011. Tarnished Rings: The International Olympic Committee and 
the Salt Lake City Bid Scandal. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
Wermuth, C. 2016. Fédérations sportives internationales. Conséquences d'un changement de la forme 
juridique [International Sports Federations: Consequences of a Change of Legal Form]. MP 
Intervention of 16.06.2016.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
ire
 D
e L
au
sa
nn
e] 
at 
05
:16
 29
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
